Proforma Safety Blog

Welders Ignite Foam Sealant; Smoke Out Storeroom

Posted by proforma on July 24, 2011  |  No Comments

Welders ignited expanding foam sealant in a rig’s storeroom while trimming a guidepost. The workers had failed to anticipate what effect their work might have on the materials. The incident produced significant smoke damage, but fortunately no loss of life or equipment. Read the details here.

Welders Burned in Explosion, Fire Offshore GOM

Posted by proforma on December 5, 2010  |  No Comments

Three workers welding on a workover rig were injured in a fire and explosion that occurred offshore Gulf of Mexico, 20 miles south of New Orleans. The rig was not in production at the time. As reported by WWLTV, this accident is the third rig incident since the Deepwater Horizon.

If you’re looking for a source of basic guidelines for safe welding operations, this safety alert developed by the OSHA Alliance Program is directed at shipyard safety, but offers good advice applicable beyond this scope. The work evolved from alliances OSHA has developed with the American Industrial Hygiene Association, the American Society of Safety Engineers and shipbuilding associations.

We recently posted this article on the Chemical Safety Board issuing 18 recommendations to OSHA, the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) and other agencies  related to safe hot work operations.

Poor Job Planning Could Have Resulted in a Welding Disaster

Posted by proforma on April 6, 2010  |  No Comments

In light of the recent catastrophic event at the Tesoro refinery in Anacortes, WA, it’s important to review all safety procedures with all personnel. This narrowly avoided incident serves as yet another warning to follow proper Permit to Work (PTW) procedures.

The job involved welding of the tank and piping of a rig accumulator supply tank.  The welder was unaware that the tank had not been purged nor cleaned, and the lid was closed and secured.  A passing rig site senior mechanic spotted the welder and realized the explosive atmosphere that existed. He immediately called a stop to the operation.

The situation was compounded by the fact that no pre-job safety check off list had been completed. There was not a well defined fire watch, as the designated person was involved in other duties at the time and no replacement identified. A fire extinguisher or pressurized water hose was not within the working vicinity as required by policy and the Permit to Work procedure. And although a PTW document had been issued, the appropriate personnel were not involved. The document had been incorrectly filled out and many details were not followed as required.